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"A Million Dollars and an Apology": Prostitution
and Public Benefits Claims
. *
Margaret A. Baldwln
I stole my title from Jennifer Greenberg, the tireless, inspiring director
of the Florida Battered Women's Clemency Project. The Clemency Project
represents Florida women who have been convicted of killing their abusers,
and who are seeking executive clemency. The context was as follows.
Jenny and I were discussing her concerns about one of the Project's clients.
The woman had been tortured, raped and battered for years by the man she
ultimately killed. The police had ignored her emergency calls until the day
she was arrested. She was then prosecuted relentlessly for a crime for
which she should not have been charged. The good news was that the
Clemency Board seemed favorably inclined toward the woman's petition,
and the Project staff was preparing for her release. The bad news was that
some state officials were questioning the Project's plans for her "aftercare":
the living, employment and support arrangements she would have available
to her after her release from prison.
Jenny was also deeply concerned about the woman's future in a world
that had abandoned her so many times in the past. Troubling, though, was
the seemingly punitive attitude of the state officials in raising these
concerns. As if the fact that the woman had no one to turn to, and nothing
to rely on should count as another strike against her. As if the state had not
played a key role in destroying her life. As if the state could not,
conceivably, owe something to her. "Aftercare?" Jenny asked. "A million
dollars and an apology, now that would be aftercare." I agree. That is
what "economic justice" for Jenny's client would, to my mind, consist of:
generous, respectful provision of the material and moral conditions
necessary to exercise self-determination, to forge a self-regarding identity,
to enjoy belonging among and being cared for by others. To my mind,
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thank Murdina Campbell, April Cherry, Beth Gamrnie, Jennifer Greenberg, Deborah Hart,
Gabriele Plendl, Greg Thompson and Ruth Witherspoon for their insights, experience and
friendship. Christina Rexroat provided able research assistance. A research grant from
Florida State University College of Law supported the production of this paper.
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economic justice for prostituted women-from whom so much has been
taken for so long-would look the same.
That is the vision of economic justice informing this paper, and it is a
big order. It is hard, these days, to imagine economic justice-for
anyone-in any terms but the most withered and capitulated. The gap
between rich and poor widens yearly, with job growth in this country
largely confined to the "junk job" sector. I As many as thirty percent of
American workers are "contingent workers": disposable, part-time and
temporary.2 Forty-one million Americans now lack health insurance. 3 Our
entire social welfare system, especially programs benefiting women and
children, is under attack. 4 State health, education and training support
functions are increasingly relegated to the nationally booming prison
system. 5 With socialism fatally stigmatized, we little dare to even imagine
ideals of economic justice-much less demand concrete legal or legislative
progress toward those goals. The economic situation of women generally,
or of prostituted women in particular, in these new times is hardly
mentioned. But I want to swim against that tide, and offer here specific
proposals promoting access to public benefits for prostituted women. I
posit, at the outset, that economic justice for prostituted women means, that
at a minimum, no woman be required to participate in prostitution to meet
any of her basic survival needs, and that it is a duty of government to
guarantee women's freedom from prostitution in those terms.
My analysis of the treatment of prostituted women under state benefits
programs thus differs in significant respects from the approach advanced
1. See, e.g., JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY
(1998). Galbraith summarizes his findings: "[s]ince 1970, the pay gap between good and
bad jobs in America has grown. It is now so wide that it threatens, as it did in the Great
Depression, the social stability of the country." James K. Galbraith, With Economic
Inequality for All, THE NATION 24 (Sept. 7114, 1998). See also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (documenting the
elimination of jobs from urban, minority communities).
2. See Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt,
or Organize?, 22 N.YU. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557,558 (1996).
3- See ROGERS M. SMITH, THE NATION 12 (Sept. 7114, 1998). Smith, a professor of
political science at Yale University, describes the current economic landscape,
Asian economies are imploding, the world's poor are expanding, more than
a fifth of our own children are impoverished, American schools are falling
apart, a record 41 million of us lack health insurance and the nation is
experiencing the widest divergence of income, wealth and opportunity in
fi ve decades.
Id.
4. For an analysis of the current attack on welfare from a leading welfare historian, see
GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END (1998).
5. By 1995, the number of incarcerated persons in the United States exceeded one million.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Prison and Jail hunates, 1995 (NCJ161132). See generally JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN, IT'S ABOUT TIME: AMERICA'S
IMPRISONMENT BINGE (Brian Gore et al. eds., 1994). Irwin and Austin report that spending for
corrections increased 59% between 1980 and 1988, while welfare spending decreased by 27%.
Id. at 17.
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by some prostitutes' rights organizations. They claim that prostitutes
should receive all employment-based public benefits and legal protections
on the same basis as other working women and men. Among these
programs and guarantees are Social Security benefits, 6 worker's
compensation protections,7 Fair Labor Standards Act regulations,8 sexual
harassment remedies under Title vn9 and collective bargaining rights. 10 In
addition, prostitution rights advocates have asserted that these guarantees
must be extended to prostitutes' families, including repeal of anti-pimping
laws. I I These proposals are typically advanced through an assimilationist
argument. On this argument, prostitution should be treated like any other
kind of gainful work, and relationships prostituted women have with men
and their own children should be treated the same as any other family in the
employment benefits system. 12 However, these demands are usually
strongly linked with arguments for the decriminalization of all forms of
prostitution-for all involved or who benefit from the practice. Indeed, the
argument for decriminalization often quickly overshadows any other
concrete proposals for benefits entitlements made on women's behalf.
I strongly agree that prostituted women should be entitled to the
substantial benefit structure attaching to paid employment and to maternity
in this country. I am especially sympathetic to the effort to re-categorize
prostitution as "work," and to legally acknowledge prostituted women.
However, I do not endorse a "prostitution as work" strategy as a route to
economic justice for prostituted women. There are two fundamental
reasons for my reluctance, one pragmatic and the other substantive. Both
reasons also inform the position I do take on the future and necessity of
public benefits programs for women in prostitution.
The pragmatic concern is based on the real-life observation that,

6. See, e.g., Tracy M. Clements, Prostitution and the American Health Care System:
Denying Access to a Group of Women in Need, BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 48, 68-83 (1996)
(analyzing availability of Social Security disability benefits and Medicaid to prostituted
women).
7. See, e.g., Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights in Sex Work: The Struggle for
Dancers' Rights as Employees, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 521 (1996) (analyzing status of nude dancers
as "employees" under worker's compensation protections, and wages and hour regulations).
8. See id. (evaluating FLSA eligibility status of women working as dancers in strip clubs).
See also cases cited infra at note 93 and accompanying text.
9. See Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant
for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 163 (1997) (liability of
employers for sexual harassment of women employees required to wear sexually provocative
uniforms at work).
10. See Siobhan Brooks, Dancing Toward Freedom, in WHORES AND OrHER FEMINISTS 252
(Jill Nagle ed., 1997) [hereinafter WHORES AND OrHERFEMINISTS] (describing events leading up
to organization of dancers at the Lusty Lady in San Francisco).
11. See Draft Statement from the 2nd World Whores' Congress (1986), reprinted in SEX
WORK: WRITINGS BY WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 307, 319-20 (Frederique Delacoste &
Priscilla Alexander eds., 1987).
12. See id.
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twenty-five years after the effective legalization of stripping, live sex
performance and pornography, only a handful of job-based reforms of
women's working conditions in the sex industry have actually been
achieved. 13 Working conditions in strip clubs have, in the past ten years,
apparently worsened for most women. 14 We need to examine why this is
true. Of course, labor organizing and effective employee advocacy are
always difficult struggles. In addition, municipal and state neglect of
women's complaints regarding wages and working conditions against strip
clubs and live sex venues dampens the confidence of women who
complain, reinforcing the illusion of omnipotence that club operators too
often enjoy and use to exploit dancers. 15
Ultimately, an explanation for this lack of real change must also be
found in the conditions under which women are recruited, used and
retained in the sex industry. The experience and effects of prostitution,
stripping and other public sex performance drastically undermine women's
efforts at self-protection, collective empowerment and economic mobility.
These conditions include serial sexual abuse, beatings, humiliation, drug
and alcohol use, grinding despair and depression linked to repeated sexual
exploitation. 16 A recent study conducted in Minneapolis/St. Paul by Ruth
13. To my knowledge, in the United States, there has been only one successful
unionization campaign, among dancers in a strip club. See Brooks, supra note 10, at 255.
Other initiatives have been limited to intermittent wages and hour challenges by the U.S.
Labor Department. See infra note 93.
14. For an informative description of these changes, see Lisa E. Sanchez, Boundaries of
Legitimacy: Sex, Violence, Citizenship, and Community in a Local Sexual Economy, 22 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 543,557 (1998). Sanchez reports:
Since the expansion of the strip industry, dancers complain of having less
control over their situation and the kinds of performances required to make
the money they need. For example, when topless dance clubs went 'fully
nude,' dancers reported having to 'do more' to get tips.... Because
customers can see the exterior of a woman's body from any seat in the club,
they no longer pay women to give 'peek shows' or to remove additional
articles of clothing. Rather, they pay for increased proximity, for close-up
views of the more interior portions of a woman's body, and for touch.
Additionally, in the new regime of club dancing, dancers are being pressured
or required by management to do booth or lap dances ....
And while the degree of physical contact between dancers and customers
continues to escalate, the pay scale has progressively eroded. Dancers have
gone from making a living wage plus tips in the late 1980's to making no
wage at all in 1996-0nly tips in most clubs. . .. It is not only women in
prostitution who have been raped, beaten, or murdered .... During the fIrst
summer that I conducted research in the city, the body of a woman who had
left a shift at a strip club where she had worked for only six days was found
burning in a metal dumpster near the club.
Id. at 557-58.
15. See Speech by Johanna Breyer, Exotic Dancers Alliance, delivered at the Hastings
Women's Law Journal Symposium, Economic Justice for Sex Workers (on file with the
Hastings Women's Law Journal).
16. For a review of research studies documenting the incidence of sexual and physical
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Parriott substantiates many earlier findings documenting the traumatic
psychological and health effects of prostitution. Almost all of the women
in the Parriott study categorize themselves as chemically addicted-most
frequently to alcohol and crack cocaine. 17 They report high rates of
exposure to sexually transmitted disease and resultant pelvic inflammatory
disease. 18 One-half had been physically assaulted by johns and two-thirds
had been raped by them, often with extreme violence. Ninety percent had
also suffered high levels of violence from others, with over half being
beaten at least once a month. 19 Sixty-two percent report a sexual assault
prior to being prostituted, over half by a family member. 20
Long-term traumatic effects are normal among prostituted women.
Stress-related effects include sleep disorders, flashbacks, depression,
suicide attempts and self-mutilating behaviors. 21 The growing literature
documenting the impact of domestic and sexual violence on health and
employment corroborates the trauma findings specific to prostitution.
Recent research documents that domestic violence alone
may be the number one drain on the domestic economy through
direct medical costs, disability, long-term welfare dependence,
child neglect, homelessness, depression and other mental illnesses,
chemical dependence, criminal behavior by battered women and
their children, truancy, and loss of employment and productivity
among women in the workforce. 22

violence, terrorism and murder against prostituted women and girls, see Margaret A.
Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 7 YALE J.
L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992).
17. Half the women reported that they were high "all the time" while soliciting and turning
tricks; 34% described themselves as high at least half the time. 96% had used crack cocaine,
71 % within the previous 6 months. 78% percent began using crack while involved in
prostitution. Ruth Parriott, Health Experience of Twin Cities Women Used in Prostitution:
Survey Findings and Recommendations 15 (1994) (unpublished study on file with author).
18. 85% of the women in the Parriott study had contracted at least one of the SID's most
injurious to health: chlamydia, syphilis, gonorrhea, genital warts and genital herpes. Four STD
episodes was the average number experienced, most commonly chlamydia and gonorrhea. 31 %
reported at least one episode of pelvic inflammatory disease. Id. at 13.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 18-19.
21. /d. at 17. The level of stress responses, Parriott found, "did not significant! y vary across
types of prostitution, levels of exposure to prostitution, or age of initiation," id. at 17, but did
significantly increase among women who had experienced sexual violence prior to being
prostituted. Id. These PTSD findings are consistent with research conducted among 130
prostituted women in San Francisco by Dr. Melissa Farley. See Melissa Farley & Howard
Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 27(3) WOMEN & HEALTH 37
(1998). Parriott's subjects further reported suicide attempts at a rate of 46%, with 65% of those
who reported at least one attempt reporting multiple attempts. 19% reported self-mutilating
behaviors, such as cutting. Parriott, supra note 17, at 17.
22. Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health Care:
A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 153, 207 (Spring 1995), citing AM. MED. ASS'N, The Billion Dollar
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The combined data on domestic and sexual abuse shows that:
Over the course of protracted sexual and physical abuse, long-term
physiological problems often emerge. Somatic complaints are
common among battered women as a result of living in a state of
fear. Chronic pain, agitation, insomnia and stress are common. A
battered woman seeking medical care for an injury is more likely
than a nonbattered woman to exhibit signs of depression, anxiety,
family, marital, and sexual problems, and vague medical
complaints. 23
Finally, Dr. Melissa Farley's recent research on prostituted women
reveals that two-thirds of the women interviewed suffered post-traumatic
stress disorder at severity levels more intense than Vietnam veterans
seeking treatment for the condition. 24 To the extent that assimilationist,
"prostitution as work" and family advocacy strategies flatten, normalize or
marginalize these conditions, they fail both the women they claim to serve
and the cause they promote.
My second area of disagreement with the "prostitution as work"
position is frankly substantive and normative. I fundamentally reject the
basic claim that prostitution is a job. What, after all, does it mean to label
an activity a "job," or a relationship system a "family?" I think what we
mean when we call an activity a "job," or a group of relationships a
"family," is that they further human needs for work and love that even
those of us who often argue with Sigmund Freud's work can affirm as
basic. The work at a job and the love of a family are the ways we seek to
meet our individual needs for defining an identity-for achieving a sense of
belonging and for the material means to express these drives. Prostitution
offers none of the productive or emotional rewards represented by
meaningful work and accompanying supportive emotional community.
Instead, prostitution damages the integrity of women's identities,25 impedes
women's capacities for emotional and sexual intimacy26 and forces women
to take on an identity they reject internally. 27

Epidemic, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 6,1992.
23. Id. at 209, citing Sandra K. Burge, Violence Against Women as a Health Care Issue, 21
FAM. MED. 368, 373 (1989); Public Hearing before the Commission on Sex Discrimination in
the Statutes, Sex Discrimination in the Health Field and in the Delivery of Health Care 174
(1994) (testimony of Barbara Price, Executive Director of the N.J. Coalition for Battered
Women).
24. See Farley & Barkan, supra note 21, at 45.
25. See id.
26. In Ruth Parriot's study, for example, "three-fourths of the women mentioned difficulty
establishing an intimate relationship outside prostitution, due to the inability to separate the fear,
disgust, and emotionally-distanced attitude developed in prostitution from the dynamics of a
loving relationship." Parriot, supra note 17, at 4.
27. Thus, the Farley & Barkan study found that 88% of the women said they wanted to get
out of prostitution, 78% said they wanted a home or safe place and 73% said they wanted job
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In these real terms, prostitution is not a job-and it is a mistake to
advocate for prostituted womens' interests on the cruel fiction that it is.
Instead, public benefits programs should be scrutinized for how their
exclusion of prostituted women from coverage prevents women from
participating in work they value, loving relationships and a self-regarding
life.
Moreover, these needs are not only personal and psychological, but
define public and social obligations as well. Consequently, as a right of
citizenship, social equality and individual dignity, a program of economic
justice must afford the means for women to meet those needs-and not
only with money, but accompanied by recognition, friendship and authentic
concern for women's well-being. Speaking of the needs of trauma
survivors for commonality with others, Judith Herman guides us toward
these kinds of reconnections between survivors and community that should
shape our policies:
Commonality with other people carries with it all the meanings of
the word common. It means belonging to a society, having a public
role, being part of that which is universal. It means having a
feeling of familiarity, of being known, of communion. It means
taking part in the customary, the commonplace, the ordinary, and
the everyday. It also carries with it a feeling of smallness, of
insignificance, a sense that one's own troubles are 'as a drop in the
sea.' The survivor who has achieved commonality with others can
rest from her labors. Her recovery is accomplished; all that
remains before her is her life. 28
The remainder of this Article explores how well two important public
benefits programs perform these obligations. The two programs I address
are the state workers' compensation systems and the federal Social Security
disability program. 29 Both programs define eligibility for benefits in
tnllmng. See Farley & Barkan, supra note 21, at 44. These women were not identifying
prostitution as a job, as a way to have good relationships or as an identity they embraced for
themselves. Even activists with a prostitutes' rights perspective acknowledge this but prefer to
explain women's resistance to identifying as prostitutes or sex workers as a response to the
stigmatized status of sex work, rather than as a form of resistance to the sex work itself. For
example, Samantha, co-Director of COYOTE in San Francisco, describes the difficulties she
has encountered in sustaining a support group for sex workers: "[I] think its more accurate to
talk about a community of sex workers than a 'movement.' A movement has to be public and
most prostitutes aren't interested in that. They don't see what they're doing as an identity; it's
just a temporary job." WENDY CHAPKIS, LIVE SEX ACTS: WOMEN PERFORMING EROTIC LABOR
206--07 (1997).
28. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 235-36 (1997).
29. Issues relating to government enforcement of minimum wage, overtime, and working
conditions regulations, the exercise of collective bargaining rights, the redressability of sexual
harassment, racial harassment and other equal rights claims are beyond the scope of this paper.
For analysis of these legal protections in the context of prostitution and stripping, see sources
cited supra, notes 6-10.

w

196

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10: 1

relation to the claimant's working life, but from rather different
perspectives. The workers' compensation system affords compensation for
work-related injuries or disease; the social security disability program
affords benefits for persons whose long-term or serious impairments
prevent them from working. I examine how adequately each program
addresses the survival and recovery needs of women in the sex industry. I
especially interrogate how the legal template of each program's definitions
of work and disability affect prostituted women's claims. Along the way, I
will address the importance of the criminal status of prostitution in
determining benefit eligibility under each plan. Again, it is not my aim to
rationalize prostitution as work through this analysis, or to argue for the
decriminalization of prostitution. My aim is to secure the best possible
recovery benefits for prostituted women.
I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION W AGE- REPLACEMENT PROGRAMS.

Patrice Hanson worked as an "exotic dancer" at the Hide-Out Saloon in
the state of Idaho. As she was leaving work one night after her shift, she
was shot and killed in the parking lot of the bar. Her husband and child,
Harold and Jesse Hanson, brought a Workmen's Compensation claim for
survivor's benefits available under the Idaho workers' compensation
statute. 30 Work-related killings of the kind suffered by Patrice Hanson are
tragically common among women involved in prostitution and sexual
performance,31 as are the sexual assaults, batteries, drug and alcohol-related
fatalities and suicides already sadly catalogued. 32 All of these kinds of
injuries have been held within the scope of workers' compensation benefits
programs. 33 Other injuries commonly suffered by women in the sex
industry, which are often compensable under state workers' compensation
systems, are disabilities resulting from emotional stress 34 and job-related
30. See Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444 (Idaho 1988).
31. For sources on the murder rate among prostituted women, see Baldwin, supra note 16, at
88. See also KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 44--48 (1995).
32. See sources cited supra notes 16-26, and accompanying text.
33. For cases involving sexual assault, see Eliot 1. Katz, Annotation, Workers'
Compensation: Sexual Assaults as Compensable, 52 A.L.R. 4th 731 (1987 & Supp. 1997); for
suicides, see Rodney R. Nordstrom, Suicide as a Compensable Injury Under Workers'
Compensation Statutes: A Review of Judicial Decisions, 16 EMP. REL. L. 1. 37 (1990); for
physical assaults, see 1 ARTHUR LARSON & lEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 11.00 (1998) [hereinafter LARSON & LARSON]; for alcohol fatalities, see
2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995); Panagos v. Industrial Commission, 524
N.E.2d 1018 (TIl. App. 1988).
34. See Aya Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims Under California's
Workers' Compensation System, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1327 (1994). A mental strain case, with
interesting implications for claims brought by women in prostitution or stripping, is Mapp. v.
City of Philadelphia, 317 A.2d 680 (Pa. Cornrow. 1974). In Mapp, the court held that benefits
should be paid to a female undercover police officer, for disability resulting from excessive
strain experienced while posing as a prostitute for five months. This holding should be helpful
precedent for women actually used in prostitution and stripping, not only posing as such, for
periods of time much longer than five months.
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physical injuries. 35 Benefits available for compensable injuries typically
include cash payments, medical care to the worker injured on the job, and
cash payments for dependent survivors, like Patrice Hanson's family. 36
What legal hurdles face sex industry claimants, such as Patrice
Hanson's family, in seeking compensation for these injuries? Two basic
issues affecting recovery pose special complications for claims brought by
sex industry survivors. The first is the requirement that the injury be
causally linked to, and arise in the course of, the worker's employment. 37
The second is the question of who qualifies as an eligible "employee"
under the applicable statute?8 Since workers' compensation programs are
intended fundamentally to provide a substitute for wages a worker has lost
from a work-related injury or condition, each of these eligibility criteria is
aimed at segregating work-related from personal occurrences, and at
identifying the person or entity primarily responsible for workplace harms.
For women in prostitution, application of these tests is deeply
problematic. Participation in the sex industry has the effect of collapsing
boundaries between work and life, and blurs issues of power and
responsibility-the very distinctions that these tests are designed to
sharpen. The boundary-blurring of work and life takes place on several
levels. Prostitution and stripping exhaust, disorient and depress women;
the self-medication women do with drugs and alcohol intensify these
effects. The daily control exercised over women to keep them enmeshed in
making money with sex work leads to the erosion of other relationships and
thwarts personal autonomy. 39 As a result, women tend to participate in
fewer and fewer other life activities-like battered women often do,
35. A case raising such factual issues, but which was ultimately tried in tort, was Doney v.
Tambouratgis, 587 P.2d 1160, 1161-65 (Cal. 1979) (club owner liable for $3,945
compensatory, $12,500 punitive damages for personal injury sustained by dancer from beating
by club owner; no bar by virtue of workers' compensation coverage since employer did not
plead workers' compensation protections).
36. Since these are state programs, there are local variations in scope of coverage and
benefits. For a state-by-state survey of available benefits, see 10 LARSON & LARSON, supra note
33, at app. B.
37. See infra notes 42-71 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
39. Pimping is done this way; club owners also use scheduling patterns to control
virtually all of a woman's waking hours. Carrie Benson Fischer recounts an example of this
practice explained to her by Kelly Holsopple, an advocate for women in stripping and
prostitution:
Clubs often structure dancers' hours in a way that uniquely burdens their
lives. Holsopple explained that clubs often schedule a dancer to work with
several hours off between her working shifts; for example, she might be
scheduled to perform between two and four 0' clock, and then again from six
0' clock until midnight. Rather than leave the club premises during the
interim, the dancer will most likely remain there and perhaps mingle with
the customers. In this manner the club is able to book longer periods of
dancers time without having to compensate them for doing so.
Benson Fischer, supra note 7, at 75 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
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retreating to sleep and self-protective isolation. 40 Prostitution and stripping
also require women to create an illusion of personal interest in the
customer, a dynamic that in and of itself hedges the difference between
work and personal life. 41 So too, are power and control arrangements
among women, customers and club owners obscured. Consequently, as the
following discussion examines, prostituted women may find themselves
both over and underdetermined as eligible claimants on these tests.
A. "Arising out of' a "course of employment."
The "course of employment" requirement ordinarily demands proof of
two elements. First, a claimant must prove that the injury or condition
arose out of the course of employment and second, that it was incurred in
the course of employment. As applied, the "arising out of' test usually
requires a showing of a causal connection between the risk of injury and
the employment. 42 The "in the course of employment" test asks whether
the injury was inflicted while and where the employee was performing job
tasks or related activities. 43
In Hanson, Patrice Hanson was killed on the property of the bar,
apparently by a customer or a stranger. The employer did not contest that
the death was employment-related. Nor should claimants typically
encounter difficulty proving the requisite link between prostitution-related
injuries and the employment setting. The sexual assaults, emotional and
psychological injuries, beatings, and alcohol and drug-related injuries that
prostituted women commonly experience are demonstrably coextensive
with the requirements, conditions and risks of working in clubs and
practicing prostitution. Therefore, the "arising out of' causal element
should be relatively simple to establish.
Moreover, the "course of employment" standard should also be
40. "My knees, back, and feet hurt. I had to sleep most of the time I wasn't working or
working out." Stacy Reed, All Stripped Off, in WHORES AND OrHER FEMINISTS, supra note 10,
at 179, 187. "You're sleeping half of the day and then going to work at night. You're just a
complete vampire." Benson Fischer, supra note 7, at 75 (citing interview with former dancer
named Kaylee, on Dateline: The Naked Truth? (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 28, 1995)).
41. For an extended and thoughtful exploration of this process as the core sexual demand
made on women in prostitution, see BARRY, supra note 31, at 28-36. Barry describes the
collapse of the self-performance distinction demanded by customers:
In prostitution, what men expect from women is the semblance of emotional,
sexual involvement, the appearance of pleasure and consent, a semblance
that they can treat as if it is real in the moment of the commodity exchange.
In this sense, they want prostitutes to behave like non-prostitutes-wives,
lovers, and girlfriends.
Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
42. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 6.00 (summarizing leading judicial
interpretations of "arising out of' requirement; causal link issue the core question).
43. See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 14.00 ("An injury is said to arise in the course
of the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.").

" ,_ _!
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analyzed in terms of the pervasive and continuous control to which women
are subjected by clubs, brothels and pimps, both on and off the job, to
ensure that the women keep working and keep coming back. 44 In addition,
the ad hoc customer-defined expectations of women in actual prostitution
and stripping transactions should expand the definition of her "course of
employment" to the limit of his potential. 45 For example, an increasing
number of women in stripping acknowledge the pressure they continuously
experience, from both pimps and club owners, to prostitute in connection
with their activities as dancers. 46 Women injured in those transactions
should assert that the prostitution transactions occurred in the course of
club employment. 47 In short, to the extent that a woman's involvement in
the sex industry gradually consumes her whole life, as is not uncommon,
all of the injuries and effects of that process should conceptually satisfy this
job-relatedness standard.

44. For example, the women at the legal Mustang Ranch brothel in Nevada worked under
conditions of nearly total surveillance: "A work day was 14 to 16 hours, with 3 weeks on
and one off. The women weren't allowed out unless they could hustle a customer who
wanted to take them into Reno. Occasionally, they received permission to leave for 2 hours
of shopping." BARRY, supra note 31, at 232.
45. For a very insightful discussion of how such ambiguity is exploited by johns and clubs as
"a procurement technique and a justification for violence," see Sanchez, supra note 14, at 26368.
46. For a description of current strip club practices consistent with this view, see Sanchez,
supra note 14, at 562-63, 566-68.
47. The reasoning, if not the result, of a claim brought by a procurer/pimp, supports my
analysis here. The claimant worked as a bell man at a hotel and "made arrangements" for
women to prostitute in the hotel. Jackson v. Dudley, 461 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1969). The
claimant rented rooms for the women, procured johns and took a cut of the women's money.
Id. at 937. On the night the bell captain sustained his injury, one of the bellboys told him to
check on one of the women, "because she was out of order." Id. The bell captain went to
the room where the woman was assigned to turn tricks. He found her intoxicated and in "no
shape to send anybody up." Id. She asked for more liquor, which he refused. As he was
leaving the room, she took out a gun she had in her purse and shot him twice. Id.
Despite the bell captain's contention that his job duties included investigating any
disturbances in the hotel, the court disallowed benefits on the ground that his injuries did not
arise out his duties in connection with his work as a bell captain. Instead, "[iJt may be logically
deducted from the evidence that at the time of the accident claimant was attempting to sober up
one of the girls working for him so she could continue to ply her trade and earn money for both
the claimant and herself." Id. However, the court's reasoning suggests that had a closer link
been established between the claimant's duties to the hotel and his pimping, the result might
have been in his favor. Id. Unlike the case of the bell man/pimp, an indisputably close nexus
exists between a woman's employment as a stripper and an act of prostitution with a customer.
Cf Upchurch v. Indus. Comm, 703 P.2d 628 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing claim by injured
truck driver who apparently was injured in the course of a prostitution encounter while on the
road).
This theory still leaves prostituted women who do not work in strip clubs without
recourse because the underlying employment contract may be held to be illegal. See notes 7586 infra and accompanying text. Further, even for an injured woman who is employed legally
as a stripper, the success of her claim still depends on a court holding that she enjoyed employee
status at the club, which the discussion at notes 87-114 infra and accompanying text suggests, is
far from certain.
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Two judicial decisions, both involving alcohol-related traffic fatalities,
are consistent with the view offered here regarding the appropriate scope of
the "course of employment" rule in the context of sex work. Both cases
held that the claimants, one a dancer in a strip club and the other a belly
dancer in a supper club, had consumed intoxicants in the course of their
employment, and that the ultimate injuries were caused by those working
conditions. 48
In 2800 Corporation v. Fernandez,49 Jacqueline Fernandez sought
workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained in a car crash that
occurred an hour after she left work at the Bottoms Up Lounge in Council
Bluffs, Iowa. 5o The driver of the car was a co-worker named April.51 Their
duties at the club included dancing and interacting with the male customers
when not dancing. In addition, a significant job requirement for the
dancers was to get the customers to buy them at least two drinks per hour.
Dancers ordinarily consumed over six to eight alcoholic drinks during a
six-hour shift from 8:00 p.m. to 2:00 in the morning. Dancers had to be
seriously intoxicated before they would be reprimanded for excessive
drinking. 52 Based on these practices, the state industrial commission found
that the "consumption of alcohol by dancers was condoned if not
encouraged by lounge management. ,,53
The Friday night before the accident, Ms. Fernandez and her friends
injected crank, or methamphetamine, most of the night after drinking at
work. During the day on Saturday, she and another dancer consumed part
of a twelve-pack of beer and reported late to the club. Ms. Fernandez got
very drunk at work until she could barely walk. At closing time, the
manager then told both her and April that they were drunk and thus ordered
them to leave the club. 54 Ms. Fernandez got into April's car, and less than
an hour later and a few miles from the club, April smashed the car into a
retaining wall. April died as a result of the crash. Medical experts
confirmed that April was drunk at the time of the accident. 55
The employer argued, unsuccessfully, that Ms. Fernandez' injuries
were not compensable because her drinking and drug use before work,
rather than her drinking at work, caused her intoxication. The employer
asserted that the use of illegal substances by the dancers was neither known
about nor condoned by the employer. 56 The agency and the state Supreme
Court rejected both assertions, noting that, first, the employer required the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
528 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1995).
Id. at 126.
!d.
Id.
Id. at 127.
!d.
Id.
Id. at 128.
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dancers to hustle drinks from customers, and second, because of this
requirement, the employer should consequently expect that this would
result in the dancers becoming intoxicated. 57 Further, the court identified
two aspects of drink hustling that directly benefited the employer: profit
from the sale of drinks and the customer appeal of the atmosphere created
by this type of interaction with the women. 58 Since Ms. Fernandez'
intoxication was attributable to her work, and her intoxication impaired her
judgment, which resulted in her entering the car of another intoxicated
individual, the court affirmed the commission's conclusion that Ms.
Fernandez' injuries arose in the course of her employment. 59
The court also considered the employer's argument based on the usual
rule barring claims for injuries occurring off the employer's premises while
the employee is on her way to or from work. The employor argued that
this rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, should preclude the claim
here. 60 While acknowledging the general rule, the court held that the "zone
of danger" exception properly applied in this case. The "zone of danger"
exception effectively extends the legal dimensions of the employer's
premises to reach any injury "which occurred at a point where the
employee was within the range of dangers associated with the
employment.,,61 As in this case, "[w]hen an employer encourages or
condones excessive drinking ... the employer ought to be held responsible
for foreseeable injuries suffered by the employee because of the resulting
intoxication. ,,62
In an analogous case, an Illinois appellate court reached a similar
conclusion. In Panagos v. Industrial Commission,63 claimant Jasmin
Durson asserted a claim for total permanent disability for injuries she
sustained in a car accident that occurred on the way home from her work as
a nightclub belly dancer. 64 Ms. Durson was employed to dance two-twenty
minute shows, spaced within a four-hour shift, from 10:00 p.m. until 2:00
in the morning. In between performances, she was expected to socialize
with the employer's customers. Dancers were not prohibited from drinking
during these periods. In fact, Ms. Durson testified that she was encouraged
to drink by the employer, although the employer denied this. In any event,
there was no dispute that the profit made from the drinks went exclusively
to the employer. 65

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.

/d.
Id. at 129.
Id.

61. /d., quoting LARSON'S WORKERS' COMP., THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §
15.00 (1986). The same rule now appears at 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 15.00.
62. Femandez, 528 N.W.2d at 130.
63. 524 N.E.2d 1018 (TIl. App. 1988).
64. /d. at 1019
65. Id.
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Ms. Durson testified that the employer directed her interactions with
customers all evening on the night she was injured-introducing her to one
table of customers early in the evening, excusing her from her second
performance, asking her to sit with several other tables on his instruction
and instructing her to sit with the first group to end the evening. She also
testified that, as she was getting into her car after her shift at 4:00 a.m., the
employer asked her if she needed a ride home. Again, the employer denied
directing her contact with customers or offering her a ride. 66
The appellate court affirmed the industrial commission's conclusion
that Ms. Dursun was injured in the course of her employment on two
grounds. The court found that "the claimant had been drinking liquor prior
to the accident with the tacit approval of her employer," and in addition,
"her incidental act of personal comfort (drinking liquor) was not
unexpected and resulted in a reasonably foreseeable end result
(drunkenness and an auto accident) that occurred within an hour after her
leaving work.,,67
The common-sense acknowledgment by these courts that drinking is a
job requirement for women in strip clubs-affecting women's lives inside
and outside the club-has potentially radical ramifications for women's
benefit eligibility. On the same reasoning that drinking is mandatory,
courts should also find that rape, battery and chronic post-traumatic stress
disorder are risks inevitably borne by women engaged in commercial sex.
All of these harms and conditions should be compensable injuries for
workers' compensation purposes. Moreover, to the extent that a woman's
involvement in prostitution is facilitated or coerced by boyfriends/pimps,
injuries inflicted by them should be held within the "zone of danger"
created by the woman's employment. However, claimants need to be
aware that the success of such claims turns on a court's determination that a
woman's employment life is seeping into her personal life and not vice
versa. In the context of a prostituted woman's life, the choice may be
essentially unstable. A court could instead readily reverse the conceptual
paradigm, finding a woman's private life overtaking her employment life
and use this as a basis for denying her claim.
A court could frame this analysis under the "personal risk" principle,
which excludes from the course of employment those injuries and risks
"personal to the claimant.,,68 The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on the
personal risk principle in denying a compensation claim brought by a
dancer, Debra Morris, who sustained a paralyzing gunshot wound to the
neck inflicted by a co-employee, Linda Hill. 69 Both women were dancers
at Bruce's Cocktail Lounge. Hill shot Morris in the neck as Morris was
66.
67.
68.
69.

[d. at 1019-20.
/d. at 1021.
1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 12.00.
See Morris v. Soloway, 428 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. App. 1988).
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walking out of the ladies room. Morris testified that the dispute began with
an argument over a dance costume. Since the employer did not provide
costumes or make allowances to purchase them, the dispute was held to be
purely personal and consequently non-compensable under the states
workers' compensation scheme. 70
This case demonstrates the recovery problems that can arise for
claimants when a court takes a view of the merger of work and life contrary
to that espoused by the Fernandez court. The Fernandez court viewed the
events of the claimant's day as "all work.'.?} In contrast, the Morris court
framed the claimant's day, even in the club in an encounter with a coemployee regarding work attire, as involving wholly personal and private
matters. 72 Whether or not the specific holding in Morris was correct, the
important point is that application of a legal standard that turns on a
work/life dichotomy is bound to be arbitrary as applied to women's livesespecially where that difference has little practical meaning.
B. "Employee" status.
Another significant limitation on women's recovery prospects under
the workers' compensation laws is the requirement that the claimant be an
"employee" within the meaning of the applicable state law. There are two
common restrictions on the definition of "employee" that most concern
potential claimants injured in the course of prostitution and other sex work.
The first restriction is the limitation of employee status to those with legal
contracts of employment. This restriction bars recovery at the outset for
injuries arising from illegal prostitution transactions, at least for the woman
involved. 73
The second restriction is the exclusion of so-called
"independent contractors" from recovery under workers' compensation
statutes. Strip club owners, who routinely assert that the dancers who work
at their clubs are (ineligible) independent contractors rather than (eligible)
employees, have most often exploited this limitation. 74 These requirements
are based on important judgments about relative responsibility and control
exercised among people involved in the sex industry. As I suggested
earlier, the relevant doctrine does little to clarify or evaluate appropriately.

70. Id. at 44. This is a strange story, at least to me. I have never heard of a dispute over a
dance costume escalating to violence, much less an ambush-style shooting. It was interesting to
me that the court also noted that linda Hill was a "dangerous drug dealer who carried a gun."
Id. Hill was killed before she could testify. Id. It seems to me that this shooting was likely
drug-related, rather than about a costume. If it was drug-related, then the same reasoning relied
upon by the court in Fernandez could yield a conclusion that drug transactions, like alcohol
consumption, were events in the course of and arising out of the dancer's employment.
71. 528 N.W.2d at 128.
72. 428 N.W.2d at 44--45.
73. See cases cited infra, at notes 75-86.
74. See cases cited supra notes 69-72; infra notes 75-82.
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1. Illegal Contracts of Employment
The rule extending contracts for illegal acts from the scope of workers'
compensation laws was crafted in response to claims brought by injured
bootleggers and bartenders during Prohibition. 75 The exclusion should
probably be understood as a narrow one. Employee misconduct in and of
itself, even if amounting to criminal behavior, has long been held an
insufficient basis for denial of benefits so long as the employee was
otherwise acting in the course of employment. 76 Moreover, an employment
contract which is illegal due to the incompetency of the claimant to enter
into the agreement (ordinarily because the claimant is a minor) typically
will not bar a compensation claim brought by the injured worker. 77 To bar
compensation on the grounds of illegality, it seems that the claimant must
75. Prohibition-era bartenders: Herbold v. Neff, 193 N.Y.S. 244 (1922); Snyder v.
Morgan, 154 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1931); Beer delivery personnel: Swihura v. Horowitz, 152 N.E.
411 (N.Y. 1926); Pepper v. Direnzo, 46 Pa. D. & c. 118 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1943). All
of the cases were apparently decided on the grounds of public policy, rather than by
reference to an explicit exclusion of such employments from the definition of covered
employees in the state workers' compensation law. In Snyder, the court affirmed the
principle that "[i]t is only in those cases where the contract of hiring is valid that the
Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable. Contracts that are prohibited by express
legislative enactments do not come within the cognizance of the Bureau." Snyder, 154 A.2d
at 526. In Herbold, the court was less restrained: "This court cannot lend its aid to the
enforcement of any claim growing out of a contract of employment, one of the purposes of
which is the violation of a law of the land making the sale of intoxicating liquors a criminal
offense." Herbold, 193 N.Y.S. at 245. The Swihura court summarily affirmed the lower
court's denial of benefits where the lower court had found based on the claimant's own
testimony that he was engaged in an illegal employment at the time of the accident.
Swihura, 152 N.E. at 411.
A modem case standing for the same principle is DePew v. State Accident Insurance
Fund, 703 P.2d 259 (Or. App. 1985) (compensation denied to employee shot in the back while
working at an illegal gambling club).
76. A statement of the general principle is offered by Larson:
Misconduct of the employee, whether negligent or wilful, is immaterial in
compensation law, unless it takes the form of deviation from the course of
employment, or unless it is of a kind specifically made a defense in the
jurisdictions containing such a defense in their statutes.
2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, §§ 30.00. For cases applying this rule, see e.g. Kochilas v.
Industrial Commission, 654 N.E.2d 568 (TIL App. 1995) (holding that violating a law in the
course of one's employment does not per se remove the employee from course of employment
for workers' compensation purposes); Boryca v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 487 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1992) (claimant's compensation affirmed despite the fact that he was discharged for
wilful misconduct, including making threatening phone calls to his co-employees); Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 169 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (stating that an employee is not necessarily removed from the course of
employment for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act even if that employee's conduct in
the course of employment was illegal or criminal); Stembridge Builders, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission, 636 N.E.2d 1088 (TIl. App. 1994) (illegal conduct during a business-related errand
that may have contributed to an accident does not remove an employee from the course of his
employment for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act).
77. See, e.g., Bowers v. General Guaranty Co., 430 S.W.2d 871,872 (1968) (holding that an
employee is covered by Workers' Compensation even if the contract for employment is
prohibited by statute, or otherwise, as long as the employees duties are legal).
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be hired under a contract of employment that is unenforceable and be hired
to perform acts which are of themselves violations of penal laws.
I have found no reported cases involving a claim brought by a
prostituted woman in her status as a prostitute,78 where her eligibility for
benefits was challenged on the ground of the contemplated illegality of the
underlying employment contract. However, both disqualifying conditions,
unenforceability and substantive illegality, are met in a typical contract for
prostitution. In addition, a court may invoke public policy grounds for
denying a claim brought by a prostituted woman, even if the technical
illegality of a contract for prostitution could be overlooked doctrinally. For
example, the DePew court clearly expressed the view that worker's
compensation laws should not be used to benefit workers whose
occupations are "[n]ot necessary to the enrichment and economic wellbeing of our citizens.,,79 Considerations of public morality may also come
into play, based on related precedent.
Surviving spouse claims can be denied on the ground that the spouse
has been or is involved in a "meretricious relationship" with a third party.80
Disqualifying meretricious relationships include engaging in prostitution.
Other dependents may also be barred from recovery if the dependency
involved immoral conduct. 81 As one Pennsylvania court explained,
78. See Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 65 P.2d
1349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937). This case involved a claim brought by Dorothy Cook, who was
employed as an entertainer and also earned commissions for encouraging customers to buy
drinks while she was not on stage. The court upheld her claim for compensation, despite the
fact that the contract under which she was employed was illegal for the employer to offer. State
law nowhere expressly criminalized an employee's acceptance of such employment, though, nor
forbade accepting payment for performing duties under the contract. Since the prohibition was
directed solely at the employer, the employee's compensation claim was held unaffected by the
employer's illegal act. [d. at 1350--51.
79. DePew, 703 P.2d at 260. In particular, the DePew court prohibited compensation to
workers employed under contracts to perform criminal activities. [d.
80. See Insurance Company of North America v. Jewel, 164 S.E.2d 846,847 (Ga. Ct. App.
1968) (holding a claimant is not entitled to compensation even after she participated in a
marriage ceremony with the employee and only later learned employee was married to someone
else); Shultz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 621 A.2d 1239 (Pa. Commw. 1993);
McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 603 A.2d 238 (Pa. Commw. 1992)
(termination of widower's benefits). However, these rules appear to be eroding. See e.g., Todd
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 692 A.2d 1086 (p.A. 1997) (termination of death
benefits not warranted even though the employee's widow was living in a meretricious
relationship with third party after the employee's death, where widow married third party prior
to the employer filing a petition for termination of benefits); Campbell v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, 695 A.2d 976, 979 (Pa. Commw. 1997) (alleged meretricious
relationship between claimant and third party does not bar receipt of benefits where sexual
relationship between employee and claimant had ceased prior to employer's petitioning for
termination of benefits).
81. See, e.g., Jewel, 164 S.E.2d at 847. A distinction is drawn between claims where the
"dependency itself grew out of, or resulted from the immoral act of the claimant" and "cases
where the support had no relation to the immorality." [d. As an example of the latter, the Jewel
court offered the example of a daughter who is a prostitute and is dependent upon a father. "In
such a case, where morals have nothing to do with the dependency, she would, upon his death
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compensation laws should be construed to foster "good morals by
encouraging legally recognized family relationships and discouraging illicit
relationships. ,,82 These reasons, singly or in combination, could likewise
be recited to deny claims for injuries sustained in illegal prostitution
transactions.
In my view, neither public morality nor criminal justice goals are
promoted by barring compensation claims brought by prostituted women.
After all, claimants seeking benefits are attempting to leave prostitutionnot to continue participation in the practice. Benefits payments may be the
support a woman needs to transition to a life beyond prostitution.83 To
deny her benefits is to participate in pimping her further. Indeed, several
recent Pennsylvania cases narrowly construing the scope of the
"meretriciousness" exclusion appear to acknowledge the unfair and
punitive impact of the rule. 84 Further, denial of claims on the ground of
contract illegality has the effect of rewarding johns, pimps, club owners
and other people who benefit from prostitution transactions, while the
entire burden of harmful impact is carried by the woman. Such unfair
windfalls for employers have been recognized and addressed in the
majority of state statutes, which bar the use of illegality defenses by
employers who seek to resist compensation claims brought by illegally
hired minors. 85 The basic rationale for allowing compensation in those
cases is that child labor prohibitions are intended for the protection of
minors, and employers should not be able to compound the benefits of their
criminal activity by asserting the illegality of the contract as a shield when
under the conditions prescribed in the Workmen's Compensation Act, be entitled to
compensation. Under these circumstances, her morals have nothing to do with the matter." Id.
82. Nevius v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 416 A2d 1134, 1137 (p.A
Commw. 1980). As the Jewel court put the point: "Nor do we adhere to the view that the
Workmen's Compensation Act should, under the guise of liberal construction, be so construed
as to provide a statutory reward for immoral conduct." Jewel, 164 S.E.2d at 847.
83. The research finding by Farley and Barkan, that 88% of the prostituted women in their
study wanted to leave prostitution, supports this conclusion. See Farley & Barkan, supra note
21.
84. Recent cases narrow the scope of the rule by a combination of a highly technical
construction of the petition requirements, and a practical, need-based approach to determining
the validity oftechnically sufficient challenges. For the technical angle, see Todd v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, 692 A2d 1086 (P.A 1997) (holding that the date on which the
employer files petition challenging widow's benefits is the date the existence of the meretricious
relationship is determined; benefits not terminated when widow had married third party by the
date petition was filed); Campbell v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 695 A2d 976
(Pa. Commw. 1997) (termination of benefits unwarranted where meretricious relationship had
ceased by the time the employer's petition was filed). For examples of substantive liberality in
continuing payment of benefits, see Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (Sadvary), 570 A2d 84 (P.A 1990) (allowing continued receipt of benefits by
widow living meretriciously with a man; basis for the decision was the fact that the widow was
completely dependent on the worker's compo benefits and lived in an economically depressed
area). Cf. Schultz, 621 A2d at 1243 (finding that termination of benefits was permissible where
claimant had sufficient means to support herself in the relationship with the third party).
85. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 47.52(a).
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a child is injured on the job. 86 Admittedly, criminal prohibitions against
prostitution are generally not intended for the protection of prostituted
women. However, courts should look behind the superficial symmetry of
status among johns, pimps and prostituted women to the actual dynamics of
control, responsibility, and risk, operating in prostitution transactions. By
failing to do so, the fact that prostituted women, rather than pimps or johns,
are the people who suffer the greatest injuries in prostitution transactions,
under conditions that they can little control, remains unaddressed. This
only serves to further benefit pimps and johns. This grossly inequitable
distribution of benefits and risks is the basic inequity that the workers'
compensation laws were intended to remedy, a purpose which the "illegal
contract" shield should not continue to thwart.
2. Independent Contractor Status
Many women work in positions within the sex industry that are not
illegal, and therefore they do not confront the same "illegal contract" bar
facing women engaged in illegal prostitution. Nevertheless, similar issues
of power, responsibility and risk confront courts in the context of claims
raised in legal sex venues. Most importantly, courts must determine
whether women who dance in strip clubs or perform in other live sex
settings should be classified as employees (who would be eligible for
workers' compensation) or as independent contractors (who would not be
eligible).87
In a majority of jurisdictions, the question is decided by reference to
the common law "right of control" test. This test asks "whether the
employer assumes the right to control the time, manner, and method of
executing the work of the employee as distinguished from the right merely
to require certain definite results in conformity with their agreement. ,,88 In
86. See, e.g., Garnhum's Case, 202 N.E.2d 255, 253 (Mass. 1964) (asserting that
"[r]estrictions upon the freedom of contract imposed in the interests of society in general and for
the benefit of minors in particular must be observed by those seeking to avail themselves of the
services of those under age"; double compensation claim allowed for underage claimant who
had lied about his age); Lopanic v. Berkeley Cooperative Gin Co., 191 So.2d 108 (Miss. 1966)
(holding that employer bears the burden of not employing minors under the child labor laws;
double compensation recoverable by injured minor who misrepresented his age).
87. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02 (13)--(15) (defining employee, employer and
employment). See generally Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers' Compensation: Detennining the
Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 419
(1994).
88. Hanson v. BCB Inc., 754 P.2d 444,446 (Idaho 1988), quoting Burdick v. Thornton, 712
P.2d 570, 572 (Idaho 1985). The Hansons had also urged the court to adopt an alternative test,
the "nature of the work" test, Hanson 754 P.2d at 446 n.l, which has been adopted in other
jurisdictions. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 45.10. The "nature of the work" test
asks "( 1) whether the work being done is an integral part of the regular business of the
employer, and (2) whether the worker, relative to the particular employer, furnishes an
independent business or professional service." Hanson 754 P.2d at 446 n.t. The Hanson court
declined the Hansons' invitation to adopt this test, both on the ground that the "right to control"
test had been reaffirmed in a long line of Idaho case law, and because the two tests are largely
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short, if the employer can control both the result and the method of
performing the work, the worker is an employee. This determination is
made by reference to four factors. The four factors are: "( 1) direct
evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) the
furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fIre. ,,89
In a minority of jurisdictions, a test assessing the "nature of the work"
is applied, either exclusively or as a default rule when the right to control
test yields an ambiguous result. The "nature of the work" test, advocated
as the better rule by Professor Larson, looks directly to
the character of the claimant's work or business-how skilled it is,
how much of a separate calling or enterprise it is, to what extent it
rna y be expected to carry its own accident burden and so on-and
its relation to the employer's business, that is, how much it is a
regular part of the employer's regular work, whether it is
continuous or intermittent, and whether the duration is suffIcient to
amount to the hiring of continuing services as distinguished from
contracting for the completion of a particular job. 90
While the "right to control" test examines the employment relationship
by examining traditional agency principles, the "nature of the work" test
evaluates the relationship from the standpoint of a major purpose of the
workers' compensations laws-to distribute the risk of workplace accidents
to the consumer of the product, through the entity best able to carry
insurance for the accident. 91
The two reported workers' compensation cases, applying the abovediscussed factors in the context of sex work, both involve women who
worked as dancers in strip clubs. 92 In both cases, the courts struggled with
the appropriate application of the "right to control" factors in evaluating the
relationship between the clubs and the dancers who worked there. The
courts' uncertainty is understandable, given that the standard itself is
designed to identify an employer/employee relationship that is remote from
the sexual interactions and economic arrangements typical among dancers,
overlapping in substance. Id.
89. See Hanson, 754 P.2d at 446, quoting LARSON, supra note 61, §44.00. The United States
Supreme Court recited the common law factors in greater detail in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992), holding that the common law test applies in construing the
definition of "employee" in ERISA claims. See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220
(1958) (identifying ten factors to be evaluated in distinguishing an employee from an
independent contractor).
90. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 43.52.
91. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 43.51. The test for employee status applied in
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act claims, the "economic reality" test should be distinguished
as yet another standard. See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987).
92. Hanson, 754 P.2d at 447; Cy Investment, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation
Insurance, 876 P.2d 805 (Or. 1993).
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customers and owners in strip clubs. Fundamentally, the club guarantees
the presence of dancers on the premises, while creating the appearance that
the women are freely interacting with the patrons on their own initiative,
whether on stage or off. As between the dancers and the clubs, a
combination of zero or minimal wages, ad hoc scheduling and strong club
rules and incentives promoting customer access to the dancers is the
norm. 93 Under these ambiguous arrangements, club owners enjoy obvious
benefits and power over dancers as a group. Because women's pay is
dependent on customer tips, without meaningful club regulation of
customer behavior, dancers may feel that the non-regulation of their shifts
and performances by club management is their only remaining leverage for
negotiating relative safety under bad working conditions, including abusive
customers.
Without fixed schedules and performance requirements,
dancers may be able to refuse shifts, types of performances and contact
with certain customers who are especially abusive. 94 However, these
arrangements turn the usual independent contractor/employee distinction
inside out-neither the dancers nor the club owners control either the
process or the result of the dancers' efforts. Ultimately, it is the customer
who exercises the "right to control" dancers' performances and pay. It is
this right of control over women that the club owners are selling as the
entertainment. And, it is customers' inclinations that the dancers must
93. Cases examining alleged federal wages and hours violations offer additional examples of
the weak/strong model I am suggesting here. In Reich v. Circle C. Investments, Inc., 998 F.2d
324 (5th Cir. 1993), dancers at the lipstick and Crazy Horse Saloon were paid only in tips from
customers, and in fact had to pay a nightly $20 "tip-out" to the club to perform on the club stage.
The club enforced customer access, both by tip rules, and by enforcing scheduling, tardiness and
customer "mingling" times. Costume standards and final say on music selections were the only
performance-specific rules imposed by the management on the dancers. Id. at 327. Dancers
working under similar conditions at the Heavenly Bodies club, sued for minimum wage
violations in Reich v. ABClYork-Estes Corp., 157 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. TIL 1994). The dancers paid
a larger nightly "tip-out" of $50--$60 and the club specified dance movement and table dance
procedures. Id. at 679. At the Cabaret Royale, sued in Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586
(N.D. Tex. 1995) for similar minimum wage violations, dancers only had to sign in on a shift
schedule, had no dance rotation shifts, and were not explicitly required to interact with
customers. Nor were dancers required to have prior dance experience or conform their dances
to any performance standards. They received no wages and the club acknowledged that "the
ability to engage in conversation with club patrons and develop continuing relationships could
increase an entertainer's revenue." Id. at 591.
94. One dancer states: "I directed my lighting and music if I chose to dance on stage at all;
decided whether, when, and for whom to perform personal dances; took breaks as I saw fit; and
even danced barefoot when I liked." Stacy Reed, All Stripped Off, in WHORES AND OrHER
FEMINISTS, supra note 10, at 179-80. However, the same author, describes the following
working conditions as typical:
Strippers in Texas make $20 for three minutes of undulation. A half hour of
seductive behavior and two taxing deadbeats could precede that money.
Four-inch heels ruin the back and feet. Few clubs offer health insurance.
Every several weeks the drunken asshole turns up. Other strippers, DJs, and
managers can all drain a dancer. Suffocating smoke and blaring music are
no picnic either.
Id. at 186.
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satisfy, to get paid at all.
This displacement of the right to control, from the club owners onto the
customers, helps explain the confusion evident in judicial treatment of the
issue in the context of stripping. In Cy Investment, the Oregon appellate
court reviewed an agency determination that twenty-two dancers at Cy's
Parkrose Pub were not "workers" under the "right of control" test. 95 Facts
concerning the pub's method of hiring dancers, scheduling and payment
practices, and supervision of performances were uncontested. Women who
successfully auditioned at the pub could sign up for shifts on a weekly
schedule. Many of the women performed at other clubs, with half using
"agents" to obtain bookings.96 Dancers were paid a fee for every shift
worked, averaging $6.00 an hour. In addition to these wages, dancers
earned "substantial tips, which exceeded their wages.,,97 The dancers
signed a form contract at the end of each shift, indicating the hours of each
woman's shift and compensation received. The form also indicated that the
dancer was responsible for her own taxes and workers' compensation; the
dancers generally reported their earnings on Schedule C forms, deducting
as business expenses the cost of costumes, tanning and professional
grooming. 98 Cy's reported the compensation paid to the dancers to the IRS
on Form 1099s, as "non-employee compensation." Supervision of dancing
performances was limited to regulation of time spent on and off stage;
dancers provided their own costumes and music. Fines were imposed for:
"failing to confirm their scheduled appearances, tardiness, failing to
complete their shift, and touching the mirrors on the stage.,,99
Similar arrangements were the norm in Hanson. loo In testimony before
the state Industrial Commission, the owner of the Hide-Out Saloon and
Patrice Hanson's husband detailed the work arrangements between the
Hide-Out and the dancers who worked there. As in Cy Investment, Hanson
had no written employment contract. Scheduling was likewise relatively
ad hoc, although there was conflicting testimony on the point. Hanson's
husband testified that Patrice Hanson danced three to five nights per week,

95. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 806.
96. Id. I put "agents" in quotation marks because I am less convinced than the court
evidently was that these persons functioned as ordinary entertainment agents. Lisa Sanchez
recounts this exchange between a dancer and herself on the subject of agents:
Heidi: ... I've been through many of 'em [agents] that, "OK, well, if you do
this or this, I'll give you this shift." They would sit there and bribe the girls
for money shifts.
L.S.: What did they want from you?
Heidi: Oh, just blow jobs, you know, just under the desk. Take 'em home,
whatever. It's a sex business. That's all there is to it.
Sanchez, supra note 14, at 567.
97. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 806.
98. Id. at 806.
99. /d.
100. Hanson v. BCB, Inc., 754 P.2d 444,445 (Idaho, 1988).
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at the owner's discretion. The owner testified that the dancers scheduled
themselves on a sign-up calendar, and that Patrice Hanson often came in
later than the 4:00 p.m. starting time and left before the I :00 a.m. quitting
time. As in Cy Investment, dancers had to supply their own costumes;
although in Hanson, the bar provided the music. The Hide-Out paid less
than a minimum wage. Hanson's pay, and that of the other dancers, was a
split of the cover charges (divided solely and equally among the dancers),
the tips each woman received from customers and one free drink a night.
With respect to the first, second and fourth "right to control" factors,
the Cy Investment court reached ambiguous results. Analyzing the first
"right of control" factor, control over the method of performance, the court
found the facts divided. The pub evidently exercised some right of control.
The employer defined the lengths of the dancers' shifts and fined the
dancers for violating shop rules. On the other hand, because the dancers
scheduled themselves, the employer did not control when or how
frequently the dancers worked. In addition, the court considered relevant
the facts that the employer did not restrict the dancers from working at
other clubs, nor did the employer specify the dancers' costumes, music or
dance routines. The court likewise found the second factor, the "method of
payment," ambiguous. Tax behavior by both employer and employees
suggest that parties viewed the arrangement as employer/independent
contractor. However, the fee structure could suggest an hourly rate rather
than a full shift, per-performance payment. WI The fourth factor, the "right
to fire" factor, likewise tipped uncertainly between facts suggesting
employment and those suggesting independent contractor status. On the
one hand, Cy's had never terminated a dancer mid-shift, and never
cancelled a previously scheduled shift. However, Cy's could, and did,
retain the right not to invite a woman to sign on to the next weekly
schedule, effectively exercising a right to fire given the brief duration of the
period of contracted work. 102
However, these facts take on a somewhat different significance if
analyzed in the context of customer-dancer interaction. As I suggested
earlier, the ambiguities the Cy Investment court discern track a sale of
control over the dancers, from the club to the customer. The club's
minimal scheduling and loosely imposed hire-and-fire practices meet the
basic requirement of doing business as a strip club-ensuring that some
women will be present and available for full shifts to keep the customers
there all night. It is this access that the club is selling to the customer.
Once the women are placed in front of the customers, the customers, not
the club or the dancers, determine what demands the women must meet.
This arrangement is structured via the method of payment: while the club

101. See Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 807.
102. Id. at 808.
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pays the women a shift fee, tips from customers represent the women's
primary income. 103 As Lisa Sanchez explains,
women were encouraged by club management and coaxed with
their only source of income-their tips-to engage in illegal
activities, but they were expected to assume all of the risk of those
activities. . .. [H]abitual violations of rules, illegal touching, and
egregious cases of sexual harassment ... [are] a routine part of
strip-industry culture. 104
The Cy Investment court's analysis of the "right of control" factors shields
the customer's control from sight, thereby distorting these dynamics
beyond recognition. By this move, the court allocates to the dancer the
autonomy and control actually exercised over her by the customer, while
also compromising her right of recovery against the club owner.
For me, the courts' treatment of the third "right of control" factor raises
the most poignant issues. The third factor asks who furnishes the
equipment used for the job. It was the equipment factor that was contested
on appeal in Hanson,105 but was the one factor that the Cy Investment court
weighed unambiguously in favor of independent contractor status. 106 Nor
did the courts agree what the relevant equipment is, for the purpose of
evaluating this factor. However, both courts evaded the key issue of what
the job of stripping is, and consequently could not address the equipment
question squarely.
Patrice Hanson's body was the item of "equipment" analyzed
Hanson-both the Industrial Commission and a dissenting judge on appeal
treated her as worker-supplied "equipment.,,107 The equipment is an
"exotic dancer's body when she is engaged in her dancing before the
patrons of a saloon.,,108 However, the majority of the appellate court
rejected this classification. 109 The court reasoned that because in cases
involving personal services, both employees and independent contractors
103. The arrangement in Hanson with respect to these factors was similar: minimal employer
involvement in shift compliance; performance demands enforced by the customers; all forms of
payment (cover charges and tips) fixed by immediate customer satisfaction. Hanson, 754 P.2d
at 445. Unsurprisingly, the Industrial Commission found that all of these factors weighed in
favor of independent contractor status. Id. See also supra note 93.
104. Sanchez, supra note 14, at 566.
105. The appellate court did not address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
commission's conclusions respecting the other three factors. As to the first factor, the
commission found that the saloon "did not assume the right to exercise direction over the time,
manner, method and details of work performed by deceased." Hanson, 754 P.2d at 445. As to
the second, the commission stated that "the dancers chose their own days and hours of work."
/d. Finally, as to the fourth factor, "the method of pay was consistent with that of an
independent contractor." Id.
106. See Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 808.
107. Hanson, 754 P.2d at 447.
108. Id. at 448 (McFadden, 1., dissenting).
109. Id. at 447.

t'W.'61*

E*

,s.

Winter 1999]

MILLION DOLLARS AND AN APOLOGY

213

typically supply the body doing the work, the test must refer to equipment
of a different kind. 11O The court treated the dancer's use of her body as
equivalent to the uses to which a carpenter's arm or mail carrier's legs are
put. The sort of equipment to which the test properly refers, the court
stated, "include such things as tools, machinery, special clothing, parts and
other similar items necessary for the worker to accomplish the task to be
performed," not the worker's body. III
In contrast, the Cy Investment court did not address the status of the
dancers' bodies as equipment. The items of equipment under scrutiny there
only included the dancers' costumes, the music and the stage. The dancers
provided their own costumes and music (or paid Cy's for the use of its
jukebox).112 The equipment arguably provided by the employer (the stage)
was not viewed as equipment at all, but simply as the "site" of the
performance. l13 On these facts, the trial court held that the dancers were
not workers. 114
Neither court's analysis is compelling. In Hanson, the court denies the
basic unavoidable bottom line about stripping and nude dancing that, unlike
the use of the body in carpentry or mail delivery, the woman's sexualized
body is the commodity and access to her body the service. By not honestly
confronting how women's bodies are actually used as entertainment
commodities in strip clubs, the Hanson court normalizes stripping as a
regular job in an apparent effort to support the dignity of the women
performers. In Cy Investment, the court addresses the "equipment" status
of the props and trappings of the women's dancing performances-the
costumes, the music, and the stage-again without addressing the extent to
which the job itself has to do with dancing at all. In short, both courts
address the equipment question, without ever engaging directly in the
question of what job the equipment is used to perform.
Throughout this discussion, I have addressed the legal standards used
in workers' compensation systems to define job-relatedness and employee
status as applied to prostitution and stripping. These legal standards not
only inadequately capture the experience of the women involved, but also
undermine the ability of women to recover compensation. Another, more
appropriate source of public benefits for women in sex industries, may be
disability programs. These programs do not require proof of a connection
between a person's benefits claim and an employment relationship. I now
turn to one such program, the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits program.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Cy Investment, 876 P.2d at 808.
113. /d.
114. Id.
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II. SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAMS
The important role of SSI benefits in the lives of women reslstmg
prostitution is well known, at least anecdotally. So too, is the impact of
benefit cuts in pushing women into the practice. As one woman explained
after becoming homeless when dropped from the SSI disability progam
during the Reagan administration's notorious eligibility review, "I tried
prostitution .... I never in the world would have thought about doing
anything like that under normal circumstances. But, I mean, what else
could I do? Welfare's not there for me anymore.,,115 Under the current
federal program, benefits are available for persons who are disabled, aged
or blind and are intended to guarantee a minimum income level. 116 Unlike
worker's compensation plans, SSI benefit eligibility is predicated directly
on the existence of a disabling condition, without regard to the cause of the
impairment or the employment status of the disabled person. The key
eligibility provision in the statute defines "disability" as:
[I]inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months. 117
Disabling conditions, which meet the statutory standards and which are
common among women in prostitution, include depression-related
impairments, 118 anxiety disorders,119 problems with concentration
associated with anxiety,120 organ damage from beatingsl21 and foot and
back injury from dancing. 122 A significant restriction on the scope of
115. See ROB ROSENTHAL, HOMELESS IN PARADISE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN 64 (1994).
116. "The basic purpose underlying the supplemental security program is to assure a
minimum level of income for persons who are 65 or over, or who are blind or disabled and who
do not have sufficient resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Federal
minimum income level." 20 c.F.R. § 416.110 (1998).
117. 42 U.S.c. § 423(d)(1)(A) (West 1994).
118. See, e.g., Woody v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir.
1988) (uncontested evidence that claimant had become unable to do anything for himself, was
in a reactive depression and was totally disabled, justified setting aside AU's denial of benefits).
119. See, e.g., Marcotte v. Callahan, 992 F. Supp. 485 (D.N.H. 1997) (anxiety disorder
limiting claimant's tolerance in dealing with the public).
120. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Callahan, 9 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Mass. 1998) (seems to indicate
functional limitations due to anxiety or depression, difficulty maintaining concentration and
attention, understanding and remembering detailed instructions and other mental demands may
rise to the level of disability).
121. See, e.g., Kelly v. Celebrezze, 220 F. Supp. 611 (W.D.S.C. 1963) (dysfunction of the
limbs or other organs of the body).
122. See, e.g., Lopez Diaz v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 585 F.2d 1137,
1141 (1st Cir. 1978) (ankle synovitis and calcaneal spurs, rendering employee unable to travel to
and from a workplace, relevant to disability determination); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833,
837 (8th Cir. 1983) (ankle injury and resultant pain); Brown v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 447,449 (8th
Cir. 1986) (back pain in lower back).

Winter 1999]

MILLION DOLLARS AND AN APOLOGY

215

compensable impairments was enacted in 1994, which excluded
impairments to which alcoholism or drug addiction would be a
"contributing factor material to [agency] determination that the individual
is disabled.,,123 Despite the alcoholism and addiction exclusion, SSI
benefits should be pursued on behalf of women with histories in
prostitution-especially in light of the severe post-traumatic stress disorder
symptoms that often affect women's recovery and employment paths.
A basic issue affecting the availability of SSI benefits for women in
prostitution is whether prostitution or stripping may be considered a source
of income thus barring eligibility for disability benefits. By statute, a
disability claimant must be denied benefits if the claimant is working and
engaging in "substantial gainful activity.,,124 If the claimant is so engaged,
her claim is rejected without regard to her medical condition. 125 Here
again, the question of whether prostitution is work reenters the discussion,
this time as the determinative factor in determining whether a disability is
provable. In contrast to the workers' compensation programs, the statute
and current case law apparently endorse the status of prostitution as a job.
These rules effectively bar disability benefits claims for women in
prostitution and force women back to prostitution for their sole source of
income.
This result has been reached in two doctrinal steps. The first step was
the determination that illegal transactions can be properly considered
substantial gainful activity under the law. This issue was first entertained
by the courts without explicit guidance from Congress or agency
regulation. In the early 1990s, a series of district court and appellate court
cases involving claimants engaged in drug dealing, thievery or prostitution,
held that income-generating activity need not be lawful to constitute
substantial gainful activity. The fact that the claimant's work activity is
illegal is irrelevant to the disability determination. 126 In reaching this
conclusion, the courts stressed the unfairness that would result if illegallyobtained earnings were ignored in disability determinations. In one case
involving a claimant's drug dealing, the court explained:

123. 42 U.S.c. §§ 423(d)(2)(C) (West 1996). For analysis of the constitutionality and
congressional intent of this amendment, see Stengel v. Callahan, 983 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. TIL
1997). See also Linda G. Mills & Anthony Atjo, Disability Benefits, Substance Addiction, and
the Undeserving Poor: A Critique of the Social Security Independence and Program
Improvement Act of 1994,3 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 125 (1996).
124. 42 U.S.c.§ 423(e)(1) (West 1998) ("No benefit shall be payable ... to an individual for
any month ... in which he engages in substantial gainful activity.... ").
125. 20 c.F.R. § 416.920(a) (West 1998) ("If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we
will determine that you are not disabled."). See id. § 416.920(b) (1998) ("If you are working
and the work you are doing is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled
regardless of your medical condition or your age, education, and work experience.").
126. See Mooney v. Shalala, 889 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.H. 1994) (drug dealing constitutes
substantial gainful activity).
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The term 'gainful activity' could be thought to imply lawful work,
for it would be incongruous to describe even a very prosperous
thief as "gainfully employed." But there would be an even greater
incongruity in disregarding earnings from criminal activity. For
then as between two people earning the same amount of money,
one legally and the other illegally, the former would be disentitled
to seek social security disability benefits and the latter would be
entitled to seek them. The thief would be qualified, the honest man
disqualified. 127

In 1994, Congress amended the Social Security Act to be consistent
with this line of cases by affirming that the legality or illegality of the
activities generating income for the claimant was irrelevant to the question
of whether the activities constitute substantial work activity.128 Thus, it
seems clear that the fact that prostitution is illegal will be no bar to
disallowing benefits to a woman who, in the factfinder's opinion, is
engaged in "substantial gainful activity" by prostitution.
The second doctrinal step was determining whether prostitution falls
within the statutory definition of substantial gainful activity. By regulation,
substantial gainful activity has been defined as "work activity that is both
substantial and gainful.,,129 These elements can be proven by either a
factual application of a two-prong test, or by a presumption based on
monthly income. Under the first element of the two-prong test, work
activity is substantial if it "involves doing significant physical or mental
activities." 130 Here, the factfinder considers the nature of the tasks
comprising the claimant's work activity. The relevant inquiry is the extent
127. Bell v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1996), quoting
Jones v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 191, 192 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571 (7th
Cir. 1993). The statutory inclusion of illegal activities in the definition of substantial gainful
activity did not apply in Ms. Bell's case because she filed her claim prior to the effective date of
the new provision. However, The 1994 amendment reflects a congressional position congruent
with the rationale expressed in Jones and reaffirmed in Bell.
128. 1994 U.S.CCA.N. (l08 Stat.) 1464, 1499 (amending 42 U.S.C § 423(d)(4)). This
amendment approved a line of cases holding to the same effect, involving disability claims by
persons involved in drug dealing, thievery or prostitution. See Dotson v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 571
(7th Cir. 1993) (theivery); Jones v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 191 (7th Cir. 1994) (petty theft); Corrao v.
Shalala, 20 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (drug dealing); Bell v. Commissioner of Social Security,
105 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1996) (prostitution); Hardaway v. Arpel, No. 96-56594, 1998 WL 19540
(9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) (drug dealing); Mooney v. Shalala, 889 F. Supp. 27 (D.N.H. 1994)
(drug dealing constitutes substantial gainful activity); Speaks v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Services, 855 F. Supp. 1108 (CD. Cal. 1994) (prostitution); Bell v. Sullivan, 817 F. Supp. 719
(N.D. TIL 1993); Jones v. Sullivan, 804 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. TIL 1992); Dugan v. Bowen, No.
87-3713, 1989 WL 281911 (S.D. TIL Nov. 8, 1989) (unpublished), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom; Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1992); Hart v. Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 903
(N.D. Cal. 1992); Moore v. Sullivan, 1992 WL 199257 (N.D. TIl. Aug 4, 1992) (unpublished).
Cf Hammonds v. Celebrezze, 260 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Ala. 1965) (claimant's illegal
manufacture of whiskey not conclusive evidence of SGA absent evidence of earnings).
129. 20 CF.R. § § 416.972, 416.910.
130. Id. at § 416.972 (a) (defining "substantial work activity").
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to which the activity requires the use of "expertise, skills, supervision, and
responsibilities." 131 In applying this test, the legal status of the claimant's
activities may bear indirectly on the substantiality analysis. As the court in
Corrao v. Shalala concluded, some practices involved in drug dealing may
fail to meet the substantiality test where the claimant's activities offer "no
indication of initiative, organization, responsibility, or physical or mental
exertion.,,132 Under the second, "gainfulness" prong of the test, work
activity is gainful if it "is the kind of work usually done for payor
profit." 133 In any case, income over $500 per month creates a rebuttable
presumption of substantial gainful activity. 134 Thus, if prostitution is
considered a substantial gainful activity, either under the two-prong test or
presumptively, claimants may be denied the means to escape the
prostitution-the prostitution that is likely the cause of the alleged
disability in the first place.
There is case law which so holds, relying primarily on income
In Bell v.
presumption as the determinative method of proof.
Commissioner of Social Security, the Sixth Circuit denied Melinda Bell's
SSI claim alleging disability due to chronic cocaine and alcohol
dependence. 135 The court cited evidence that the claimant earned over
$500 a month from prostitution. In Love v. Sullivan, Cynthia Love was
denied both SSI and SSDI benefits because she was engaged in substantial
gainful activity as a prostitute, earning between forty-five and eighty
dollars a day.136 Finally, in Speaks v. Secretary of Health and Human
131. Id. at § 416.973(a). See also id. at § 416.973(b). Work that is performed
inadequately or that is "make-work" is not considered substantial gainful activity:
If you do your work satisfactorily, this may show that you are working at the
substantial gainful activity level. If you are unable, because of your
impairments, to do ordinary or simple tasks satisfactorily without more
supervision or assistance than is usually given to other people doing similar
work, this may show that you are not working at the substantial gainful
activity level. If you are doing work that involves minimal duties that make
little or no demands on you and that are of little or no use to your employer,
or to the operation of a business if you are self-employed, this does not show
that you are working at the substantial gainful activity level.
Id. at § 416.973(b).
132. Carrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943,949 (9th Cir. 1994). The court based this conclusion on
the grounds that Corrao's activities, as a go-between between dealers and buyers in return for
drugs, occupied less than an hour a day, most of which was spent riding as a passenger in a car.
Further, Corrao's activities "did not require any significant mental or physical exertion," and he
"did no planning," "did not use his own money for the transactions" and received his payment in
drugs. In addition, the court differentiated Corrao's activities from "traditional employment" or
from pursuing a "sole proprietorship." Id.
133. See 20 c.F.R. § 416.972(b)( 1998) (defining "gainful work activity").
134. Id. at § 416.974 (b)(2)(vii) ($500 in monthly earnings will ordinarily show that the
claimant has been engaged in substantial gainful activity). See also Dugan v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d
1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1992).
135. See Bell v. Commissoner of Socail Security, 105 F.3d 244, 246-47 (6th Cir. 1996).
136. Love v. Sullivan, No. 91C7863, 1992 WL 86193 at *3 (N.D. TIL April 22, 1992) (The
focus of the court's analysis in Love was on the significance, if any, to be placed on the legal!
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Services, claimant Veda Speaks was denied disability benefits on the
ground that she had been making at least $600 a month for over twenty
years in the practice of prostitution. 137
In Speaks and Bell, the courts further evaluated whether the income
presumption had or could have been rebutted by other factors. The relevant
statute is silent on what factual showing rebuts the income presumption. In
Bell, the claimant offered proof that her prostitution was "symptomatic of a
serious mental disorder and ... was driven by her drug addiction.,,138 The
court deemed these considerations irrelevant to the disability determination.
The claimant's proffer, the court explained, confused the fact of the
claimant's earnings with the question of what motivated her. The court
reasoned that only the fact of the claimant's earning power is of interest
under the statute. "The case law is clear that it does not matter what
motivates plaintiff to earn income from illegal prostitution.,,139 Similarly,
in Speaks, the magistrate treated as rebuttable only those factors relevant to
the determination of whether the claimant's activities were substantial and
gainful.
The magistrate concluded that prostitution is "real world
employment" thereby satisfying the substantial-and-gainful test. The court
distinguished this case from Corrao, in which intermittent and passive
drug-dealing activities were found insubstantial. I4o The Speaks magistrate
went further and rejected as legally irrelevant the claimant's assertion that
she was mentally and physically incapable of performing any other work
than prostitution. 141
The results in these cases are wrong. As the Speaks magistrate bluntly
pointed out, "the Secretary's denial of plaintiff's claim for SSI-without
deciding that the plaintiff is capable of any other activity-is tantamount to
telling her that it is expected that in the future she will earn her living
through prostitution.,,142 This result is wrong, first, because it amounts to
state-sponsored pimping. Second, it is wrong because by failing to
examine whether in fact a claimant's prostitution activities were
"substantial," these holdings are doctrinally incomplete. Tracy Clements,
in her thorough examination of these cases, faults the Speaks opinion in
particular for ignoring the evidence that might have rebutted the relied

illegal activity distinction. As other courts of the period held, the Love court concluded that
"[t]he illegality of her occupation does not negate the fact that Love has a substantial source of
income.").
137. See Speaks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 855 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (CD. Cal.
1994).
138. Bell, 105 F.3d at 246--47.
139. Id. at 247 (citing Corrao v. Shalala, 20 F.3d 943,947 (9th Cir. 1994), for the proposition
that an addict who is able to function in society, albeit illegally, indicates that she is not disabled
for SST purposes).
140. Speaks, 855 F. Supp. at 1113. See supra note 132 for a summary of the Corrao facts.
141. Speaks, 855 F. Supp. at 1113.
142. /d. at 1111.
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upon income presumption. 143
These are already significant cntIcisms, but it is the third error in
reasoning that I find most disturbing. Suppose that these were claims
brought by combat survivors whose disabilities included post-traumatic
stress disorder and physical impairments.
It would, I believe, be
unthinkable for an administrative law judge to deny the soldiers' benefits
claims on grounds that they had earned more than $500 a month while on
active duty (and implying that the answer for them is to re-enlist).
Likewise here, the very activities tacitly treated as "substantial" in these
opinions are the circumstances causing the claimed disabling condition.
Even worse, the symptoms of disabling post-traumatic stress, experienced
by prostituted women, which include dissociative illness, insomnia,
profound depression and anxiety, are emotional states that enable women to
continue to function-albeit self-destructively-in the sex industry. The
more a woman shuts down, numbs herself and the more traumatized she is,
the more she may feel she can take one more day of it. On the logic of the
Speaks opinion, the SSI program not only refuses disability benefits to
prostituted women, the program professionalizes disability.
III. BEYOND THE WORK-DISABILITY DICHOTOMY: TOWARD PUBLIC
BENEFITS FOR SEX -BASED TRAUMA.

As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, whether prostitution is
viewed as a job or as a disabling condition, prostituted women's legal
entitlements to public benefits are deeply compromised in either case. A
more promising, third alternative may be found in an unlikely text: the
1996 federal welfare reform bill.l44 I refer to that document as an unlikely
source of support for women's needs since the measures mandated by the
statute eliminate, destabilize and reduce federal benefits for poor mothers
generally. 145 However, one provision of that bill, dubbed the Family
Violence Option, authorizes state recipients of federal welfare block grants
to waive durational and other restrictions on benefit eligibility for certain
domestic violence victims. Waivers may be extended if the recipient can
demonstrate first, a history of domestic violence, and second, that
143. Clements, supra note 6, at 79. Clements observes:
[T]he court made no reference to how often Speaks solicits or engages in
prostitution, how much she is paid for each service provided, whether her
activities require a substantial investment of time, or to what degree her
activities are physically exerting.
[d.

144. Pub. L. No. 104--193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 29, 42 U.S.c.).
145. The new law mandates a sixty month, lifetime cap on receipt of benefits. See Personal
Responsibility Act, 42 U.S.c. § 608(a)(7)(A) (West 1997) (federal block grants for statedesigned welfare programs). See also id. at § 603(a)(7)(A) (explicitly declares that no
individual is entitled to assistance under any state program funded by these federal block
grants) .
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compliance with ordinary restrictions would "make it more difficult for
individuals receiving assistance ... to escape domestic violence or unfairly
penalize such individuals who are or have been victimized by such
violence, or individuals who are at risk of further domestic violence.,,146
The statute defines domestic violence as "battered or subjected to extreme
cruelty," which is defined as:
(I) physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in, physical
injury to the individual;
(II) sexual abuse;
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child;
(IV) being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child to
engage in nonconsensual sex acts or activities;
(V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
(VI) mental abuse; or
(VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care. 147
These provisions were enacted in response to feminist lobbying on behalf
of battered women-backed up with research evidence that domestic
violence is a significant barrier to many women seeking education and
employment. 148
146. Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 103, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105, 2112 (amending 42
V.S.c. 601 et seq.). A related provision, dubbed the Hardship Exception, authorizes states
to exempt recipients from duration limits "by reason of hardship or if the family includes an
individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty."
42 US.c. §
608(a)(7)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1997). The statute permits only a limited number of waivers to
be granted under the Hardship Exemption. Id. at § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii). Whether the same
restriction, or others, apply with respect to waivers granted under the Family Violence
Option is in some doubt. See Jennifer M. Mason, Buying Time for Survivors of Domestic
Violence: A Proposal for Implementing an Exception to Welfare Time Limits, 73 N.Y.U L.
REv. 621, 634-37 (1997). For analysis of the needs of domestic violence victims, and
policy implications of meeting those needs in welfare legislation, see Jady Raphael,
Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare
Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201 (1996).
147. Personal Responsibility Act, 42 US.c. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii).
148. The Family Violence Option provision was drafted by Martha Davis, Legal Director of
the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Joan Meier, Professor at George Washington
School of Law. See Felicia Kornbluh, Feminists and the Welfare Debate: Too Little? Too
Late?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov.lDee. 1996, at 24, 39. For a review of research findings
supporting domestic violence waivers, see Jady Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare
Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
201 (1996). See also Mason, supra note 146, at 638-52; Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and
Safety: Welfare Reforms for Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3
(1997); Jady Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: The Unexplored Barrier to
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Federal and state support for the Family Violence Option offers hope to
prostituted women on several levels. First, on its face the statutory waiver
option should already be available to women who have been prostituted or
have otherwise been used in the sex industry, and who meet the other
eligibility criteria for receipt of benefits. 149 The conditions defining
"extreme cruelty" under the statute clearly track the routine intimidation,
coercion and abuse suffered by prostituted women-abuse that is often
inflicted routinely during the important developmental stages in a young
woman's life. 150 Second, federal policy choices, favoring the maintenance
of the social safety net, at least for victims of sexual and physical violence,
could and should represent the beginnings of an economic and medical
recovery program tailored to the needs of sexual trauma survivors. Among
sexual trauma survivors, prostituted women are among the most deeply
affected.
The 1996 Family Violence Option is only one example of such
supportive intervention. Congressional and agency endorsement of federal
policy measures favoring continued welfare support for sexually victimized
women continues to build. 151 These initiatives link government policy
support for battered women's receipt of public benefits with the
commitments underlying existing federal criminal sanctions and civil rights
remedies extended to victims of gender-based violence under the Violence
Against Women ACt. 1S2 As Jennifer Mason points out, taken together,
Employment, 3 GEO. 1. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 29 (1995).
149. The most significant criteria are indigency and caretaking responsibility for a minor
child. Many prostituted women meet these criteria.
150. Patricia Murphy reports that domestic violence is especially injurious to young women
between the ages of 13 and 26, when young women should be building job skills and
developing a work identity. See PATRICIA A. MuRPHY, MAKING THE CONNECTIONS: WOMEN,
WORK AND ABUSE 191 (1994).
151. The authors of the Family Violence Option in the Senate, Paul Wellstone and Patty
Murray, introduced new legislation last year expressing affirmative congressional support
for the adoption of state waivers, and harmonizing the Family Violence Option with the
Hardship Exemption, providing that no numerical cap be imposed on the waivers authorized
under the Family Violence Option and that recipients so waived not be counted in
determining state compliance with work participation rates. See A Bill To Clarify The
Family Violence Option Under The Temporary Assistance To Needy Families Program, S.
671, 105th Congo § 1(1) (1997) (expressing congressional intent in enacting Personal
Responsibility Act); Id. at § 2(a) (proposed amendment to the Personal Responsibility Act,
42 US.c. § 602(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997)).
The Department of Health and Human Services proposed a new rule in November, 1997
waiving penalties against states for failure to achieve work participation rates or exceeding the
federal cap on exceptions where these defaults are attributable to waivers based on domestic
violence. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (TANF) Proposed Rule, 62
Fed. Reg. 62,124 (1997) (to be codified at 45 c.F.R. pt. 270---275) (proposed Nov. 20, 1997).
These initiatives are explained in detail in Mason, supra note 146, at 634--37.
152. See 18 US.c. §§ 2261-2262 (1994) (creating criminal penalties for crossing state lines
with intent to injure or intimidate a spouse or intimate partner, or to violate an order of
protection). See also 42 US.c. § 3796 (West 1994) (creating a civil cause of action for
remedies for violations of right to be free from gender motivated violence).
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these measures "indicate[] that Congress believes that survivors of
domestic violence have a compelling claim on federal resources, and
further suggest[] that Congress wants to encourage states to expend their
resources to aid survivors of domestic violence.,,153 The next advocacy
step-public benefits for trauma recovery itself-seems both obvious and
practicable on the existing political landscape.
Moving toward a model of public benefits for trauma recovery also
removes the case of prostitution from the no-win, work-or-disability
debate, which freezes women out from eligibility under both benefit
programs. By anchoring eligibility criteria in women's trauma recovery
needs, women's experience of prostitution emerges as a traumatic event, no
longer remaining buried under a pile of hush money that labels sexual
exploitation as "work" or "substantial gainful activity." An immediate,
additional step furthering this acknowledgement process would be to
amend existing definitions of "work activity" in current state welfare laws.
These definitions fix the rules for mandatory work participation required of
welfare recipients for continued receipt of benefits. 154 States should enact
exclusion provisions, explicitly excluding prostitution, stripping and any
other legal or illegal sexual entertainment from the definition of "work" or
"employment" for this statutory purpose. For example, such a provision
would bar welfare caseworkers from requiring a woman to take a job at a
strip club as a condition for receiving benefits. 155 Prohibiting state
mandated sex work in this way is also consistent with commitment to the
principle that no woman be required to participate in prostitution or other
sex industry practices in an egalitarian, inclusive society.
In offering these proposals, I am sadly mindful of the vicious attacks
made on single, young mothers in the course of the last rounds of welfare
"reform" in the mid-1990s. These attacks fed on the same stereotypes that

153. Mason, supra note 146, at 637.
154. For example, the definition of "work activity" in the Florida law, now called the "Work
and Gain Economic Self-sufficiency (WAGES) Act," refers generally to "full-time or part-time
employment" in the private sector that may be mandated of welfare recipients. See FLA. STAT.
ch. § 414.065(1)(a) (1998). No other definition of employment appears in the statute. Similar
provisions appear in the new California and New York welfare-to-work statutes. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. Code § 11322.6 (a-q) (West Supp. 1997); NEW YORK Soc. SERvo Law Title 9-B,
§ 336 (McKinney 1997). A general non-discrimination clause is included in the work
participation requirements in these statutes. The Florida version states that "[e]ach participant is
subject to the same health, safety, and nondiscrimination standards established under federal,
state, or loca1laws that otherwise apply to other individuals engaged in similar activities who are
not participants in the WAGES program." FLA. STAT. § 414.065 (I1)(a). See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11322.62 (non-discrimination clause); NEW YORK Soc. SERvo Law § 331 (3), §
336 (e-f). No substantive exclusions of categories of employment, as I suggest here, exist in the
state statutes cited above.
155. Nothing in this proposal should prevent an administrative agency or court from treating
prostitution or sex work as an injurious practice for purposes of awarding Social Security or
workers' compensation benefits. This proposal would only prohibit mandated sexual
entertainment practices, imposed as a condition of welfare eligibility.
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have always stigmatized prostituted women: that women's destitution and
sexual vulnerability can be explained away as products of bad choices or of
the "culture of poverty" or as evidence of greedy character. If politicians
and policymakers chose to abandon needy young mothers, and forfeit the
needs of children for intimate parenting, what hope is there for the claims
of prostituted women?
I think that hope lies in the truths about our lives that women have the
courage to tell, and in the willingness, however attention-deficit-disordered,
of legal decisionmakers to hear those truths. The last moment that truth
can be told about women, I think, is the moment just before she is
dehumanized and turned into a thing, a stereotype and a pathology. In our
society, that transforming moment occurs when a woman is beaten. That is
the moment when she is no longer seen as a person, with dignity and
personality. That is the moment before the abuser and the system swallow
her self, her hopes, prospects, reason and feelings-she is placed outside
the circle of human regard. That is the final moment when we can still see
the woman, the girl, the human being-during and after which we see only
the prostitute, the willing victim, the welfare dependent. A trauma-based
public benefits program would tell the history of this moment-all that
came before and all that comes after-on behalf of each woman,
prostituted or not, seeking assistance. If I am right, histories so told could
begin the process of re-humanizing women, all women, including the
prostituted, the battered, the raped and the murdered.
Retrieving women economically and mentally from the diaspora of
sexual dehumanization is a political and civil obligation in any society that
claims to extend full citizenship to women. 156 The full reintegration of
156. This position is consistent with that taken in the Proposed Convention Against Sexual
Exploitation, drafted principally by an expert working group convened by the Coalition
Against Trafficking in Women in collaboration with UNESCO (the United Nations
Economic and Social Council). See BARRY, supra note 31, at 304-09 (detailing the drafting
process and substantive guarantees contained in the proposal). Among the state obligations
listed in the convention are:
Article 12
State Parties agree to take appropriate measures to provide:
(a) Restitution to victims of sexual exploitation, and to insure that,
notwithstanding the victims' immigration status, their reports of
sexual exploitation receive a fair hearing.
(b) Women with educational programs and work in order to increase
women's economic opportunities and enhance women's worth and
status, thereby diminishing the necessity for women to tum to
prostitution, notwithstanding the victims' immigration status.
Article 13
State parties shall create and establish services for victims of sexual
exploitation, including prostitution, such as shelters and other social
services, and shall fund specialized health services and centers for
prostitution alternatives that are voluntary and confidential and
would provide the following:
(a) Prevention, treatment of, and testing for STDs and HIV.
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women into the life of their communities also constitutes a final stage of
healing and recovery from traumatic experience for sufferers. 157 A publicly
supported benefits program for trauma victims serves both of those aims:
expressing deeply democratic political values in material and programmatic
form and extending human acceptance and care that victims need for
authentic participation in their own lives. As Judith Herman explains:
Traumatic events destroy the sustaining bonds between individual
and community. Those who have survived learn that their sense of
self, of worth, of humanity, depends upon a feeling of connection
to others. The solidarity of a group provides the strongest
protection against terror and despair, and the strongest antidote to
traumatic experience. Trauma isolates; the group recreates a sense
of belonging. Trauma shames and stigmatizes; the group bears
witness and affirms. Trauma degrades the victim; the group exalts
her. Trauma dehumanizes the victim; the group restores her
humanity. 158
These are the first steps to the million dollars and the apology. We
should take them.

(b) Substance-abuse rehabilitation programs.
(c) Training of medical staff ....
(d) Free and elective counseling and education services.
(e) Child care facilities and housing assistance.
(f) Income support.
(g) Preferential access to credit and loans to begin smallscale business.
(h) Non-sexist skills training programs.

Id. at 332-33.
157. HERMAN, supra note 28, at 214-36.
158. Id. at 214.

